This implements fully_qualify_emoji/1, which will return the
fully-qualified version of an emoji if it knows of one, or return the
emoji unmodified if not.
This code generates combinations per emoji: for each FE0F, all possible
combinations of the character being removed or staying will be
generated. This is made as an attempt to find all partially-qualified
and unqualified versions of a fully-qualified emoji.
I have found *no cases* for which this would be a problem, after
browsing the entire emoji list in emoji-test.txt. This is safe, and,
sadly, most likely the sanest too.
Tries fully-qualifying emoji when receiving them, by adding the emoji
variation sequence to the received reaction emoji.
This issue arises when other instance software, such as Misskey, tries
reacting with emoji that have unqualified or minimally qualified
variants, like a red heart. Pleroma only accepts fully qualified emoji
in emoji reactions, and refused those emoji. Now, Pleroma will attempt
to properly qualify them first, and reject them if checks still fail.
This commit contains changes to tests proposed by lanodan.
Co-authored-by: Haelwenn <contact+git.pleroma.social@hacktivis.me>
This was done by floatingghost as part of a bigger commit in Akkoma.
See <37ae047e16/lib/pleroma/application.ex (L83)>.
As explained in <https://ihatebeinga.live/objects/860d23e1-dc64-4b07-8b4d-020b9c56cff6>
> there are so many caches that clearing them all can nuke the supervisor, which by default will become an hero if it gets more than 3 restarts in <5 seconds
And further down the thread
> essentially we've got like 11 caches (37ae047e16/lib/pleroma/application.ex (L165))
> then in test we fetch them all (https://akkoma.dev/AkkomaGang/akkoma/src/branch/develop/test/support/data_case.ex#L50) and call clear on them
> so if this clear fails on any 3 of them, the pleroma supervisor itself will die
How it fails?
> idk maybe cachex dies, maybe :ets does a weird thing
> it doesn't log anything, it just consistently dies during cache clearing so i figured it had to be that
> honestly my best bet is locksmith and queuing
> https://github.com/whitfin/cachex/blob/master/lib/cachex/actions/clear.ex#L26
> clear is thrown into a locksmith transaction
> locksmith says
> >If the process is already in a transactional context, the provided function will be executed immediately. Otherwise the required keys will be locked until the provided function has finished executing.
> so if we get 2 clears too close together, maybe it locks, then doesn't like the next clear?
It is possible for an earlier Update to be received by us later.
For this, we now
(1) only allows Updates to poll counts if there is no updated field,
or the updated field is the same as the last updated date or
creation date;
(2) does not allow updating anything if the updated field
is older than the last updated date or creation date;
(3) allows updating updatable fields otherwise (normal updates);
(4) if only the updated field is changed, it does not create
a new history item on its own.
In Create validator we do not validate the object data,
but that is because the object itself will go through the
pipeline again, which is not the case for Update. Thus,
we added validation for objects in Update activities.
I used keyword_list[:key], but if the key doesn't exist, it will return nil. I actually expect a list and further down the code I use that list.
I believe the key should always be present, but in case it's not, it's better to return an empty list instead of nil. That way the code wont fail further down the line.
During attachment upload Pleroma returns a "description" field. Pleroma-fe has an MR to use that to pre-fill the image description field, <https://git.pleroma.social/pleroma/pleroma-fe/-/merge_requests/1399>
* This MR allows Pleroma to read the EXIF data during upload and return the description to the FE
* If a description is already present (e.g. because a previous module added it), it will use that
* Otherwise it will read from the EXIF data. First it will check -ImageDescription, if that's empty, it will check -iptc:Caption-Abstract
* If no description is found, it will simply return nil, just like before
* When people set up a new instance, they will be asked if they want to read metadata and this module will be activated if so
This was taken from an MR i did on Pleroma and isn't finished yet.
Tries fully-qualifying emoji when receiving them, by adding the emoji
variation sequence to the received reaction emoji.
This issue arises when other instance software, such as Misskey, tries
reacting with emoji that have unqualified or minimally qualified
variants, like a red heart. Pleroma only accepts fully qualified emoji
in emoji reactions, and refused those emoji. Now, Pleroma will attempt
to properly qualify them first, and reject them if checks still fail.
The list of TLS versions was added by
8bd2b6eb13 when hackney version was
pinned to 1.15.2. Later hackney version was upgraded
(166455c884) but the list of TLS
versions wasn't removed. From the hackney point of view, this list has
been replaced by the OTP defaults since 0.16.0
(734694ea4e24f267864c459a2f050e943adc6694).
It looks like the same issue already occurred before:
0cb7b0ea84.
A way to test this issue (where example.com is an ActivityPub site
which uses TLSv1.3 only):
$ PLEROMA_CONFIG_PATH=/path/to/config.exs pleroma start_iex
Erlang/OTP 22 [erts-10.7.2.16] [source] [64-bit] [smp:2:2] [ds:2:2:10] [async-threads:1] [hipe]
Erlang/OTP 22 [erts-10.7.2.16] [source] [64-bit] [smp:2:2] [ds:2:2:10] [async-threads:1] [hipe]
Interactive Elixir (1.10.4) - press Ctrl+C to exit (type h() ENTER for help)
iex(pleroma@127.0.0.1)2> Pleroma.Object.Fetcher.fetch_and_contain_remote_object_from_id("https://example.com/@/Nick/")
{:error,
{:tls_alert,
{:protocol_version,
'TLS client: In state hello received SERVER ALERT: Fatal - Protocol Version\n'}}}
With this patch, the output is the expected one:
iex(pleroma@127.0.0.1)3> Pleroma.Object.Fetcher.fetch_and_contain_remote_object_from_id("https://example.com/@/Nick/")
{:error,
{:ok,
%{
"@context" => [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/activitystreams",
"https://w3id.org/security/v1",
%{
"Emoji" => "toot:Emoji",
"Hashtag" => "as:Hashtag",
"atomUri" => "ostatus:atomUri",
"conversation" => "ostatus:conversation",
"featured" => "toot:featured",
"focalPoint" => %{"@container" => "@list", "@id" => "toot:focalPoint"},
"inReplyToAtomUri" => "ostatus:inReplyToAtomUri",
"manuallyApprovesFollowers" => "as:manuallyApprovesFollowers",
"movedTo" => "as:movedTo",
"ostatus" => "http://ostatus.org#",
"sensitive" => "as:sensitive",
"toot" => "http://joinmastodon.org/ns#"
}
],
"endpoints" => %{"sharedInbox" => "https://example.com/inbox"},
"followers" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/followers",
"following" => nil,
"icon" => %{
"type" => "Image",
"url" => "https://example.com/static/media/[...].png"
},
"id" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/",
"inbox" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/inbox",
"liked" => nil,
"name" => "Nick",
"outbox" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/outbox",
"preferredUsername" => "Nick",
"publicKey" => %{
"id" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/#main-key",
"owner" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/",
"publicKeyPem" => "[...]
},
"summary" => "",
"type" => "Person",
"url" => "https://example.com/@/Nick/"
}}
A way to test the reverse proxy bits of this issue (where example.com allows TLSv1.3 only):
iex(pleroma@127.0.0.1)1> Pleroma.ReverseProxy.Client.Hackney.request("GET", "https://example.com", [], [])
{:error,
{:tls_alert,
{:protocol_version,
'TLS client: In state hello received SERVER ALERT: Fatal - Protocol Version\n'}}}
![https://example.com/static/media/[...].png](https://example.com/static/media/[...].png){kind=link}